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Abstract
We give an analysis and generalizations of some long-established
constructive completeness results in terms of categorical logic and pre-
sheaf and sheaf semantics. The purpose is in no small part conceptual
and organizational: from a few basic ingredients arises a more unified
picture connecting constructive completeness with respect to Tarski
semantics, to the extent that it is available, with various complete-
ness theorems in terms of presheaf and sheaf semantics (and thus with
Kripke and Beth semantics). From this picture are obtained both (“re-
verse mathematical”) equivalence results and new constructive com-
pleteness theorems; in particular, the basic set-up is flexible enough
to obtain strong constructive completeness results for languages of ar-
bitrary size and languages for which equality between the elements of
the signature is not decidable.
MSC2010 classification: 03F99, 03G30.
1 Introduction
Starting with the Go¨del-Kreisel theorem, it has long been well known that
the classically “standard” semantics—Tarski structures for classical first-
order logic (FOL), and Kripke or Beth structures for intuitionistic FOL—are
insufficient in a constructive metatheory. For instance, the assumption of
strong completeness for intuitionistic FOL with respect to Tarski, Kripke, or
Beth semantics in a metatheory such as IZF, HAS, or HAA1 implies the
law of excluded middle (LEM), while weak completeness implies Markov’s
principle (MP) (see [19], [12], [20]). On the other hand, constructive com-
pleteness theorems exist e.g. with respect to formal space valued models,
and in sheaf toposes more generally (see e.g. [21], [6], [11]). In a sense inter-
mediate between sheaf semantics and the standard semantics of Tarski and
Kripke, completeness was also shown (albeit assuming the Fan Theorem) to
1Intuitionistic Zermelo Fraenkel set theory; full intuitionistic second-order arithmetic;
intuitionistic second-order arithmetic with arithmetic comprehension
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hold for “countable” intuitionistic first-order theories with respect to fallible
Kripke and Beth semantics by Veldman [27] and by de Swart [8].
The insufficiency of the standard semantics can be taken to suggest that
constructive model theory should instead be carried out with respect to
sheaf models, or some variant thereof. On the other hand, the theorems
of Veldman and de Swart indicate that ordinary Tarski semantics can have
an important role to play. Thus the underlying conceptual and motivating
question of this paper is the role of Tarski semantics in constructive model
theory, or how much “mileage” one can get out of ordinary Tarski-models
in a constructive setting.
Developments of logic in a constructive setting usually assume that the
signatures are, if not in some sense countable, then at least discrete; i.e.
that decidability (LEM) holds for equality of the basic function and relation
symbols. This precludes various classical constructions, such as adding the
elements of an arbitrary domain as constants to the language. Or similarly in
categorical logic, constructing the internal language of an arbitrary category.
Here, we drop this restriction.
In a classical metatheory (with choice), the link between Tarski com-
pleteness for classical first-order logic (or its so-called coherent fragment)
and Kripke completeness for intuitionistic first-order logic is put to light in
a theorem attributed to A. Joyal in [18]. The theorem involves, among other
things, the technique of considering a theory in terms of an “approximation”
in a weaker fragment, known sometimes, or in some cases, as Morleyization.
However, the theorem is not immediately applicable in a constructive set-
ting as it relies on the assumption of Tarski completeness for the coherent
fragment of FOL. The proof ([18, Thm. 6.3.5]) also uses classical techniques.
Nevertheless, while Tarski completeness for the coherent fragment fails to
hold in a constructive meta-theory, constructive completeness results for less
expressive fragments of FOL exist. By giving a constructive formulation and
proof of Joyal’s theorem, and using the same “approximation” technique,
these can be exploited to give completeness results for stronger fragments
of FOL, and for FOL itself, in suitable pre-sheaf and sheaf toposes. For
instance, the aforementioned completeness theorems for fallible Kripke and
Beth semantics can be recovered (and given new proofs) in this way. The
purpose and aim of this paper is in no small part to “tell this story”; that
is, to give a unified and conceptual account connecting constructive Tarski
completeness, to the extent that it exists, with completeness results in terms
of traditionally studied Kripke and Beth-style models. And, furthermore, to
give this account using essentially only the two basic ingredients of Joyal’s
theorem and of Morleyization to fragments for which Tarski completeness
holds. In addition to displaying the connections between already established
results, such a clearer conceptual picture can also serve to suggest further,
and new, ones. As an instance of this, we extend constructive completeness
results to languages and theories that are not enumerable, and for which
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equality of non-logical symbols in the language can not be decided. (We
also do not, in general, assume that the sentence ∃x. x = x is valid). In
particular, we give a strong completeness theorem for the disjunctive-free
fragment of FOL, over such languages, with respect to fallible Kripke mod-
els, and a strong completeness theorem for full FOL with respect to fallible,
“generalized” Beth models. We also draw attention to a conceptual link
between Beth semantics and a “least coverage forcing the correct interpre-
tation of disjunctions”, and give a constructive version and proof of the
completeness theorem of [10] with respect to Beth models in which only the
forcing clause for disjunction is used.
The paper is structured into the following parts. Section 2 contains pre-
liminaries and notes on notation and terminology, and recapitulates Tarski
completeness for the regular fragment and enumerable coherent theories.
The regular completeness theorem for arbitrary theories and signatures
is more fully presented in [9]. The completeness theorem for enumerable
positive coherent theories is known, but is included for conceptual self-
containement. (We also note the equivalence between this theorem and
the Fan theorem, and draw a corollary concerning completeness for classical
first-order theories.) Section 3 gives a constructive reformulation and proof
of Joyal’s theorem. Section 4 introduces and analyses certain coverages on
the category of models, and gives a covering lemma which allows Joyal’s the-
orem to be stated with respect to a poset of structures and homomorphic
inclusions. This then linked with the instances of Tarski completeness in
Section 2 to give the aforementioned Kripke and Beth completeness results
theories over non-discrete languages. The specialization to the constructive
version of the theorem of [10] marks the end.
2 Constructive Tarski completeness
2.1 Preliminiaries
2.1.1 Theories, models and diagrams
In what follows we shall fix our metatheory to be IZF and simply use “con-
structive” to mean that we are working in this setting. Correspondingly,
“classically” means in the metatheory ZFC. We fix the following terminol-
ogy, conventions, and notation. By “finite” and “countable” we mean cardi-
nal finite and isomorphic to N, respectively. A “list” is a finite list. Im(a) de-
notes the set of elements of the list a, and l(a) its length. When deemed safe,
we shorten a ∈ Al(a) to a ∈ A. A subset of a set A is decidable if it is given in
terms of a function f :A // 2 as {a ∈ A f(a) = 1} and semi-decidable if it
is given in terms of a function f :A //2N as {a ∈ A ∃n. (f(a))(n) = 1}. By
an enumerable set we mean a semi-decidable subset of a (perhaps implicit)
countable set.
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Let Σ be a first-order signature. We generally assume that Σ is rela-
tional in the sense that it has no function symbols. Thus all functions and
constants are taken to be represented by relations and appropriate axioms
over Σ. Furthermore, we assume, that Σ is single-sorted. Thus Σ is simply
a set of relation symbols with associated (finite) arities. We do not assume,
unless otherwise stated, that Σ is discrete—i.e. that LEM holds for equal-
ity betweeen the elements of Σ. (As usual, however, the logical symbols,
including variables, are discrete, and disjoint from Σ). Following [11, D1],
we consider theories in FOL and fragments of FOL formulated in terms of
sequents of the form φ ⊢x ψ. These can be read as ∀x. φ → ψ. The list of
variables x is required to be a context for both φ and ψ in the sense that
it is a list of distinct variables containing (at least) the free variables of the
formula (see [11, D1.1.4]). We write x.φ for a formula-in-context. We write
[x | φ] for a formula-in-context identified up to α-equivalence. (That is, up
to renaming of bound variables and variables in the context, as in [11, D1.4].)
The context, in both cases, is canonical if it contains only the free variables
of the formula, listed in order of first-appearance. The logic is “free”, in
the sense that the sequent ⊤ ⊢ ∃x. x = x is, in general, not derivable. The
main fragments we shall be referring to are: the Horn fragment2, consisting
of sequents with formulas over Σ involving only the logical constants ⊤ and
∧; the regular fragment ⊤,∧,∃; the regular⊥ fragment ⊤,∧,∃, and ⊥; the
positive coherent fragment ⊤,∧,∨, and ∃; the coherent fragment ⊤,∧,∨,∃,
and ⊥; and, of course, full FOL. Deduction rules and further details can
be found in [11, D1.3]. The distinguished relation symbol = of equality is
included in all languages under consideration. If a theory T proves a sequent
φ ⊢x ψ we sometimes write φ ⊢
T
x ψ instead of T ⊢ (φ ⊢x ψ). Provable in the
empty theory is then written φ ⊢∅x ψ.
One would usually say that a theory is regular, for instance, if it is
axiomatizable by regular sequents. Thus a Horn theory would also be a
regular theory etc. For brevity, however, we also mean to indicate what
fragment we are considering when we say that a theory is this or that. Thus
when we say e.g. that T is a coherent theory and φ is a formula of T, we mean,
in particular, that φ a formula in the coherent fragment over the signature
of T. In the same vein, if we say that a theory is discrete, we mean that it
is over a discrete signature. If we say that a theory is enumerable we mean
both that it is over a enumerable signature and that the set of axioms is
enumerable
We say that a coherent sequent is on canonical form if it is on the form
φ ⊢x ∃y0ψ0 ∨ . . . ∨ ∃ynψn where φ and all ψi are Horn formulas, or on the
form φ ⊢x ⊥ where φ is Horn. A regular sequent is on canonical form if it
2To prevent confusion with otherwise standard usage of “Horn clause” and “Horn
formula”, note the usage here (following [11]) of “Horn formula” as simply a formula
which is a conjunction of atomic formulas, and “Horn sequent” as simply a sequent with
such Horn formulas as antecedent and consequent.
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is so as a coherent sequent. Every coherent (regular⊥, regular) theory can
be axiomatized by coherent (regular⊥, regular) sequents on canonical form
(see ibid.), and we assume that they are.
By Tarski structure for a signature, and Tarski model for a theory, we
mean the usual notion of a domain set with interpretations of the relation
symbols in terms of subsets, and the interpretations of the connectives ⊥,
⊤, ∧, ∨, and ∃ by the usual set-theoretic interpretations (as well as →
and ∀, but we do not actually consider Tarski models for anything above
the coherent fragment, with the exception of Corollary 2.2.11). The domain
need not be inhabited or non-empty. As for the interpretation of the equality
relation, we reserve “structure” and “model” for the case where equality is
interpreted as the identity relation, and use diagram and model diagram for
the case where equality is interpreted as a congruence relation3. That is
to say, a diagram for a relational signature Σ consists of a Σ-structure M
together with an equivalence relation E on |M| which respects the relations
interpreting the symbols of Σ. The interpretation [[x | φ]]M of a formula-in-
context x.φ is then defined in the usual way, but interpreting = as E.
In part to notationally distinguish diagrams, in this sense, from struc-
tures, we consider and write a diagram M as a pair (D,F ) where D = |M|
is the domain and F =
{
〈[x | φ],d〉 φ is Horn, and d ∈ [[x | φ]]M
}
, where
[[x | φ]]M is the extension of x.φ in M. We refer to an element of F as
a fact. For a signature Σ and theory T we write Str(Σ) and Mod(T) for
the category of structures and homomorphisms and models and homomor-
phisms, respectively. We write Diag(Σ) and MDiag(T) for the category of
diagrams and homomorphisms and model diagrams and homomorphisms,
respectively, where a homomorphism h : (D1, F1) // (D2, F2) between dia-
grams is a left-total relation h ⊆ D1 ×D2 such that
1. h(d1, d2) ∧ 〈[x, y | x = y], d2, d
′
2〉 ∈ F2 → h(d1, d
′
2); and
2. 〈[x | φ],d1〉 ∈ F1) ∧ h(d1,d2) → (〈[x | φ],d2〉 ∈ F2), for all (atomic)
Horn formulas φ over Σ and all d1 ∈ D1 and d2 ∈ D2.
(Here h(d1,d2) stands for the expected conjunction. As further notational
shortcuts, we allow ourselves to use function notation for homomorphisms
between diagrams when no confusion threatens. For instance we might
write φ[h(d1)/x] instead of ∀d2. h(d1, d2) → φ[d2/x]. We sometimes write
φ[d/x] ∈ F , or simply φ[d] ∈ F , instead of 〈d, [x | φ]〉 ∈ F , for brevity.)
Then there is an adjoint equivalence
Str(Σ) Diag(Σ)
i
++
kk
q
≃
3We avoid using “diagram” when extending a language with a structure, talking instead
of the language and theory of the structure.
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where i is the inclusion and q is by taking quotients, in the expected way.
The unit k : (D,F ) // q(D,F ) preserves and reflects the intepretation of
formulas and the truth of sequents. Thus, in particular, the equivalence
restricts to models, Mod(T) ≃ MDiag(T).
The diagram notation may seem cumbersome at first, but it is conve-
nient for working with presentations of structures. Let a presentation of a
diagram, or pre-diagram, be a pair (D,F ) where D is a set and F is set of
facts over Σ and D, in the sense above; that is to say, F is a set of pairs
〈[x | φ],d〉 with φ Horn and d ∈ Dl(x). For a pre-diagram (D,F ) the least
diagram containing it is the diagram generated by (D,F ). A homomorphism
of pre-diagrams is a left-total relation that is a homomorphism of the gen-
erated diagrams. The satisfaction relation  for pre-diagrams is defined as
satisfaction in the generated diagram.
For (D,F ) is a pre-diagram, the theory D(D,F ) of (D,F ) is defined as ex-
pected by extending Σ with D as constants (or unary predicates, see below)
and letting {⊤ ⊢ φ[d/x] 〈[x | φ],d〉 ∈ F} be axioms. The diagram gener-
ated by (D,F ) can then be defined as (D,
{
〈[x | φ],d〉 ⊤ ⊢D(D,F ) φ[d/x]
}
).
If T is a theory over Σ we write T(D,F ) for the union of T and D(D,F ).
When constants are not discrete, replacing constants with variables in
proofs becomes more problematic; that is, one cannot in general replace the
same constant with the same variable throughout a formula. This makes
the interplay between a theory and the theory of one of its diagrams a little
more intricate. The following lemmas, which are completely straightforward
for discrete signatures, are shown also to hold for non-discrete signatures in
[9] and stated here for reference.
Lemma 2.1.2 Let T be a theory over Σ. Let C be a set of constants disjoint
from Σ, and write ΣC = Σ ∪ C. Suppose φ ⊢x ψ is a first-order sequent
over ΣC which is provable from axioms in T. Then there exists a sequent
φ′ ⊢x,y ψ
′ over Σ and a “valuation” function f :y // C such that;
(i) φ′ ⊢x,y ψ
′ is provable from (the same) axioms in T; and
(ii) φ′[f ] = φ, and ψ′[f ] = ψ.
Lemma 2.1.3 Let T be a theory over Σ and (D,F ) be a (pre-)diagram.
Let x.ψ and x,y.φ be first-order Σ-formulas-in-context. Let c be a tuple of
elements in D. Suppose TD,F proves the sequent φ[c/y] ⊢x ψ. Then there
is a regular formula ξ in context y in Σ such that (D,F )  ξ[c/x] and T
proves the sequent ξ ∧ φ ⊢x,y ψ.
As mentioned in the beginning, we generally assume that signatures
are relational and thus that any language with function symbols has been
translated into an equivalent one without them (cf. [3]). This is in principle
so also when extending a signature with the language of one of its diagrams,
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as above. In practice this becomes burdensome, however, and we leave the
translation implicit and swept under the rug.
Finally, we say that a diagram (D,F ) is a subdiagram of (D′, F ′) if
D ⊆ D′ and F ⊆ F ′. We write (D,F ) ⊆ (D′, F ′). Note that the inclusion
D ⊆ D′ induces a homomorphism i : (D,F ) // (D′, F ′) by i(d, d′) ⇔ (d =
d′) ∈ F ′. (This homomorphism need not be a monomorphism.) A diagram
is finite if the domain is finite and the interpretations of = and all relation
symbols are finite. For enumerable signature Σ, a diagram is enumerable
if the domain is enumerable and the interpretations of = and all relation
symbols are enumerable. For discrete signature Σ, a diagram is discrete if
the domain is discrete. We define a bounded diagram to be a triple (D,F, n)
where (D,F ) is a diagram, n ∈ N, and the elements of the domain D are
pairs where the second component is a natural number less than or equal to
n. Clearly, any diagram is canonically isomorphic to a bounded one (with
bound 0, say). We shall in fact mostly restrict to bounded diagrams, but
leave the bound n notationally implicit. Let Diagb(Σ) be the category of
bounded diagrams and diagram homomorphisms.
2.1.4 Syntactic categories, Morleyization, and exploding models
Recall from e.g. [11, D1.4] the syntactic category CT of a theory T, consisting
of formulas-in-context of the language of the theory. For coherent T, the
category CT is a coherent category and models of T in a coherent category
D can be considered as coherent functors CT //D. Similarly for e.g. regular
and first-order theories, see loc. cit. for precise statements and details. The
functor CT //D is conservative (see e.g. [11]) if and only if the corresponding
model is conservative, or complete; that is, if only provable sequents are true.
We refer to the rewriting of a theory into a theory of a less expressive
fragment as “Morleyizing” the theory, after the rewriting of a classical first-
order theory as an equivalent coherent theory (as in e.g. [11, D1.5.13]). In
categorical terms, the syntactic category CT of, say, an intuitionistic first-
order theory T is a Heyting category, and thus also a coherent and regular
category. The Heyting category CT therefore has an internal coherent theory
T
coh
CT
and an internal regular one TregCT . These theories are equivalent in the
sense that their syntactic categories are equivalent.
CT ≃ CTcoh
CT
≃ CTreg
CT
The categories of models of these theories will in general not be the same
(unless we are considering classical theories and their coherent Morleyza-
tions, see loc.cit.). Nevertheless, considering the category of models of the
Morleyized theory can be fruitful, not least when the more expressive theory
has “too few models” (see [17] for another example).
There is some leeway concerning what precisely one takes the internal
language and theory of a category to be. In our case we also start from
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a given theory and not from a given category. We therefore write down
explicitly what we shall take the regular and coherent Morleyizations of a
first-order theory T over a signature Σ to be. Other fragments are similar.
Let Σm be the signature extending Σ with, for each first-order formula
φ over Σ, in canonical context x, say, a relation symbol Pφ with arity the
length of x. We write Pφ for the atomic formula over Σ
m obtained by
assigning x to the arity of Pφ. Consider the following axioms.
(Thry)
For every sequent φ ⊢x ψ provable in T, the axiom
Pφ ⊢x Pψ
(Atom)
For every atomic formula φ over Σ in canonical context x,
Pφ ⊣⊢x φ
(True)
P⊤ ⊣⊢ ⊤
(Conj )
For every conjunction θ = φ ∧ ψ over Σ in canonical context x
Pθ ⊣⊢x Pφ ∧ Pψ
(Exist)
For every existentially quantified formula θ = ∃y. φ over Σ in canonical
context x
Pθ ⊣⊢x ∃y. Pφ
(Disj )
For every disjunction θ = φ ∨ ψ over Σ in canonical context x
Pθ ⊣⊢x Pφ ∨ Pψ
(False)
P⊥ ⊣⊢ ⊥
These axioms define the coherent Morleyization of T. The regular Morley-
ization is obtained by omitting the Disjunction axiom schema and the False
axiom. Notice that in, say, the regular Morleyization of a first-order theory,
every regular formula is provably equivalent to an atomic formula; and that
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the sequent φ ⊢x ψ is provable in T if and only if Pφ ⊢x Pψ is provable in T
m.
Notice further that if we Morleyize, say, a regular⊥ theory T to a regular
theory, then Tm will prove P⊥ ⊢x φ for all regular x.φ over Σ
m. A model
diagram (D,F ) such that P⊥ ∈ F will thus have all possible facts in F . The
corresponding quotient will consist of a single point of which everything is
true (it must be inhabited since Tm proves P⊥ ⊢ ∃x.⊤). Thus, or in that
sense, it is an exploding model diagram of T.
Finally we note that the notion of enumerability for theories is not af-
fected by Morleyization. We display this for reference.
Lemma 2.1.5 If T is enumerable then so is Tm.
2.2 Tarski completeness
The dynamical method of [7], the chase algorithm of [1], and similar meth-
ods4 can be seen as simultaneous proof searches and (at least partial) com-
pletions of structures to models. In essence, one proceeds by repeatedly
applying the axioms of the theory to the structure and adding the result;
thus if, for instance, φ[a/x] is true in the structure and φ ⊢x ∃y. ψ is an
axiom, one extends the domain with a fresh element b and the interpreta-
tion in the least way such that ψ[a/x, b/y] is true. It is in several cases
known, or at least folklore, that such methods can be used constructively
to obtain completeness results for fragments of FOL. Although the object
theories tend to be assumed countable or at least discrete. We summarize
in Section 2.2.1 the relevant results from [9] concerning the construction of
a functorial “simultaneous chase” to the case of regular theories with no
size or discreteness constraints. Section 2.2.8 displays the equivalence be-
tween the Fan theorem and completeness for enumerable positive coherent
theories with respect to enumerable model diagrams—equivalently of enu-
merable coherent theories with respect to “possibly exploding” or “fallible”
enumerable model diagrams. This equivalence can to a large extent be de-
rived from the literature. In particular, Veldman’s proof [27] (which relies
on the Fan Theorem) of fallible Kripke completeness for first-order (enu-
merable) theories implies also the Tarski-completeness of positive coherent
(enumerable) theories. Nevertheless, since we are, conceptually, regarding
first-order fallible Kripke completeness as flowing from the Tarski complete-
ness of positive coherent theories, we supply a direct proof of the latter using
the Fan Theorem. The converse, that this completeness theorem implies the
Fan Theorem, is rather immediate, and we include a very short and simple
proof. This should be compared with the (equally short) proof in [14] that
the contrapositive model existence theorem for decidable (and countable)
classical propositional theories is equivalent to the Fan Theorem. (Note
4C.f. also [2] and [16])
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that the direction completeness ⇒ Fan of Proposition 2.2.13 can be carried
out in much weaker meta-theories then IZF.
2.2.1 Chase-complete sets of models for regular theories
Let Σ be a single-sorted relational signature. That is, Σ is a arbitrary set of
relation symbols (with assigned arities), not assumed to be of a particular
size nor discrete.
Definition 2.2.2 Let T be a theory over Σ, and S a class of Σ-diagrams.
We say that a functor Ch : S // S is a chase functor if for all diagrams
(D,F ) ∈ S
1. (D,F ) ⊆ Ch(D,F ), naturally in (D,F );
2. Ch(D,F )  T; and
3. for any regular formula x.ψ and d ∈ Dl(x) such that Ch(D,F ) 
ψ[d/x], there exists a regular formula x.φ such that (D,F )  φ[d/x]
and φ ⊢Tx ψ.
Proposition 2.2.3 Let T be a regular theory. Then there exists a chase
functor Ch:Diagb(Σ) // Diagb(Σ).
Proof A straightforward modification of the construction in [9]. (The mod-
ification being that, working with (bounded) diagrams rather than struc-
tures, we can have the components c(D,F ) : (D,F ) // Ch(D,F ) of the
natural transformation c : 1Diagb(Σ)
// Ch be inclusions of diagrams, rather
than homomorphisms of structures). ⊣
In general, we say that a collection of diagrams is closed under chase if there
is some chase functor Ch under which it is closed. The construction of [9]
shows e.g. that if Σ is a discrete signature, then discrete diagrams are closed
under chase. In a classical meta-theory the stronger property holds that for
a regular theory the category of models is weakly reflective in the category
of structures (cf. e.g. [2], [16]). We return to this and the case of enumerable
signatures and theories in Section 2.2.8.
For purposes of Section 3 we would, for given signature Σ and regular
theory T, like to restrict to a set S of diagrams which is nevertheless “rich
enough” for our purposes. Mainly, this involves being closed under chase,
but we add some further conditions. Say that a diagram is a finitary ex-
tension of a diagram (D,F ) if it is generated by a pre-diagram of the form
(D ∪ Im(c), F ∪ 〈[x,y | φ],d, c〉), where φ is a Horn formula, d a (possibly
empty) list of elements of D, and c is a (possibly empty) list of elements
such that Im(c) is finite and disjoint from D. Say that a collection S of
diagrams is chase-complete if: the empty diagram is in S; S is closed under
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finitary extensions (up to isomorphism); S is closed under chase; and finally
we add that, for any finite list of diagrams in S there exists mutually disjoint
isomorphic copies in S of those diagrams. We say that a collection M of
model diagrams is chase-complete if M is the collection of model diagrams
in a chase-complete category of diagrams. By Proposition 2.2.3, MDiagb(Σ)
is chase-complete. With reference to the chase functor construction of [9],
the restriction to a small and chase-complete subcategory of diagrams can be
done e.g. by building a set U based on the natural numbers and the syntax
of the theory closed under finite lists; and then consider the bounded dia-
grams whose domains are subsets of U . We leave the details. For reference,
we state, then:
Theorem 2.2.4 Every regular theory T has a chase-complete category M
of model diagrams. If the signature is discrete, then the theory has a chase-
complete set of discrete model diagrams.
We say that M is conservative for a class K of sequents if for every
sequent σ in K, if σ is true in all diagrams in M then T ⊢ σ. (If K is left
implicit it is understood to be all sequents of the fragment of the theory).
We say that M is strongly conservative for K if it is conservative for K,
and, moreover, for every (D,F ) ∈ M, the set of T(D,F )-model diagrams the
reducts of which are in M is conservative for T(D,F ).
Lemma 2.2.5 Let T be a regular theory and M a chase-complete set of
model diagrams. Then M is strongly conservative.
Proof Let T and (D,F ) be given, and let φ ⊢x ∃y. ψ be a normal form reg-
ular sequent over Σ extended withD as constants. Assume this sequent to be
true in all T(D,F )-model diagrams the reducts of which are inM. Replacing
every occurrence of a constant from D in φ with a fresh variable z, write φ =
φ′[d/z]. Let s be a list of fresh constants, disjoint from D, of the same length
as x such that Im(s) is finite. Then Ch(D ∪ Im(s), F ∪ {〈[x, z | φ′], s,d〉}) 
TD,F and Ch(D∪Im(s), F ∪{〈[x, z | φ′], s,d〉}  φ[s/x], so Ch(D∪Im(s), F ∪
{〈[x, z | φ′], s,d〉}  ∃y. ψ[s/x]. Whence T(D∪Im(s),F∪{〈[x,z | φ′],s,d〉} proves
the sequent ⊤ ⊢ ∃y. ψ[s/x]. Then T(D,F ) proves the sequent φ[s/x] ⊢
∃y. ψ[s/x]. With Im(s) being a finite set, we can conclude that T(D,F )
proves the sequent φ ⊢x ∃y. ψ. ⊣
A similar argument shows also that a chase-complete M is conservative for
geometric sequents over the signature of T. We state this for reference.
Lemma 2.2.6 Let T be a regular theory and M a chase-complete set of
model diagrams. Then M is conservative for geometric sequents over the
signature of T.
Proof See [9]. ⊣
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Finally, for the statement of Joyal’s theorem in Section 3 we transfer the
relevant results above to the case of structures for not necessarily purely re-
lational signatures. This is a straightforward application of using the adjoint
equivalence between diagrams and structures and of translating between sig-
natures with function symbols and signatures without them, and we display
it for reference. For theory T and model M, the theory TM of M is defined
as usual, so that Mod(TM) ≃ (M ↓Mod(T)).
Corollary 2.2.7 Let T be a regular theory over an arbitrary signature Σ
(not necessarily purely relational). Then there exists a strongly complete set
of models for T.
2.2.8 Enumerable coherent theories and Fan
The construction of the functor Ch of [9] relied upon in the previous sec-
tion involves applying all axioms of the theory simultaneously at each step.
(In that sense it could be said to be a “simultaneous chase”.) In the enu-
merable setting one can, instead, apply a single axiom in each step. With
disjunctions allowed in the axioms, this produces a finitely branching tree
of structures, instead of a sequence of structures. Passing from regular to
coherent theories, we therefore need the Fan theorem (with decidable bar5)
to prove completeness. The construction in this case is akin to e.g. [7] (and,
as mentioned, the resulting proposition known), and we only outline it. Re-
call that by positive coherent we mean the coherent fragment without the
logical constant ⊥.
Proposition 2.2.9 (Fan) Enumerable positive coherent theories are com-
plete with respect to enumerable model diagrams.
Proof Let T be a enumerable positive coherent theory over a relational
signature Σ, assumed to be axiomatized by sequents on normal form. An
application of such an axiom
θ ⊢x
∨
1≤i≤n
∃yi. ψi
to a diagram (D,F ) is a function f : x → D such that 〈[x | θ], f(x)〉 ∈ F .
Such an application induces n children (Di, Fi), where (Di, Fi) is the least
extension of (D,F ) containing a list y′i of distinct fresh elements of the
same length as yi and such that ψi[f(x)/x,y
′
i/yi] is true.
Given a finite diagram (D,F ), build a finitely branching tree T of finite
diagrams with root (D,F ) e.g. as follows. With T enumerable we can find
finite subtheories Tn such that T0 ⊆ . . .Tn ⊆ . . .
⋃
n∈N Tn = T. Build a
sequence of finite trees Tn with T0 consisting just of (D,F ) and Tn an initial
5For statement and basic equivalents of the Fan theorem see e.g. [23, Sect. 7], where
the relevant principle is named FAND.
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subtree of Tn+1 as follows. For each leaf (D
′, F ′) of the tree Tn, list all
possible applications a1, . . . , am of Tn to that leaf. Apply a1 to (D
′, F ′).
This induces a finite number of children which are extensions of (D′, F ′).
Apply a2 to those, a3 to the children induced by that again, and proceed
until the list of applications runs out. This produces a finite tree T ′(D′,F ′)
with (D′, F ′) as its root. Then Tn+1 is obtained by appending T ′(D′,F ′)
to each leaf (D′, F ′) of Tn. Let T be the union of the Tn. Notice that:
1) Tn constitutes (or translates to) a dynamical cover (c.f. [7]) of (D,F )
with respect to T; and 2) the union of the diagrams along a path of T is a
(enumerable) T-model diagram.
Now, let
φ ⊢x
∨
i≤n
∃yi. ψi
be a positive coherent sequent (on normal form, without loss of generality).
Assume it is true in all T-model diagrams. Let (D,F ) be the finite diagram
presented by the formula-in-context x.φ; that is the least diagram for which
the domain consists of a finite set bijective with Im(x), we can write x¯, and
φ[x¯/x] is true. Construct the tree T on (D,F ) as above. Define the subset
of nodes
B =
{
(D′, F ′) ∃i ≤ n.∃d ∈ D′. ψi[x¯/x,d/yi] ∈ F
′
}
This is a decidable subset, and since the sequent is true in all models, and
thus in all paths, it is a bar. Thus by the Fan theorem, it is a universal bar.
Accordingly, there is an n such that every leaf node in Tn is in B. And since
Tn is a dynamical cover, the sequent is provable in T. ⊣
The fallible Kripke semantics of e.g. [27] allows for exploding nodes, in
the form of nodes that force ⊥. Such nodes force all other formulas as well.
Similarly we could define an exploding structure as one that interprets ⊥ as
true. We prefer to look at this through the lense of Morleyization; a structure
for Tm yields a structure for T in which some of the logical constants are
interpreted non-standardly. In particular, if T is a coherent theory and
T
m its positive coherent Morleyization, then a Tm-model diagram (D,F )
induces an interpretation of the formulas of T, by letting the extension of a
formula φ be the extension of the corresponding predicate Pφ. We say that
this interpretation is exploding if P⊥ ∈ F . And we refer to the interpretation
of T in terms of the models of Tm as possibly exploding or fallible Tarski
semantics. We will consider further modifications in the next section. We
now have the following corollary of Proposition 2.2.9.
Corollary 2.2.10 (Fan) Enumerable coherent theories are complete with
respect to fallible Tarski semantics.
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If T is an enumerable classical first-order theory, then its coherent Mor-
leyization Tm is an enumerable coherent theory. A model for Tm can be
regarded as an ordinary Tarski model for T satisfying LEM; that is to say,
every set that is the extension of a first-order formula of the language of
the theory T must be complemented. Thus regarding a classical first-order
theory as a first-order theory containing the LEM axiom scheme, we have
as a consequence:
Corollary 2.2.11 (Fan) Classical enumerable first-order theories are com-
plete with respect to fallible Tarski semantics.
Remark 2.2.12 Corollary 2.2.11 provides an intuitionistic completeness
theorem for classical logic provided the notion of model is relaxed to al-
low exploding models. Such theorems have been derived before, notably by
Krivine (see [13] and also [4]). In fact, Krivine proves the model existence
theorem for consistent classical first-order theories (which is intuitionisti-
cally stronger than the completeness theorem), but with respect to models
in which disjunction is non-standardly interpreted. In comparison, Corollary
2.2.11 retains the standard semantics for all connectives except ⊥.
Finally, we show that the use of the Fan theorem in Proposition 2.2.9 is
essential, and conclude:
Theorem 2.2.13 The completeness of enumerable positive coherent the-
ories with respect to enumerable model diagrams is equivalent to the Fan
theorem.
Proof Let F be a fan containing a decidable bar B. We follow the notation
in [25, 4.1]. Consider the theory T over the signature consisting of a propo-
sitional variable Pn for each element n ∈ F and a propositional variable B,
and whose axioms are:
1. ⊤ ⊢ P〈〉, where 〈〉 is the root of the Fan;
2. Pn ⊢
∨
n∗m∈F Pn∗m;
3. Pn ⊢ B for each n ∈ B.
For each branch α in F let Sα be the set of sentences
Sα = {Pn ∃x. α¯x = n}
Let M = (D,F ) be a enumerable T-model. Since it is enumerable we can
find a branch α such that Sα ⊆ F . Since B is a bar, we then have that
B ∈ F . Thus M  (⊤ ⊢ B). By completeness, there is a proof of ⊤ ⊢ B in
T, with finitely many axioms, whence B must be uniform. ⊣
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Since classical first-order logic is conservative over coherent logic (see
e.g. [22]), we could have added the fallible Tarski-completeness of classical
FOL as a third equivalent statement in 2.2.13. We proceed now to the
theorem of Joyal by which one can add the fallible Kripke completeness of
FOL as a fourth. Before doing so, however, we note, for use in Section
4, that if T is a regular theory then the construction of Proposition 2.2.9
yields a sequence of diagrams, the union of which is a model of T. That this
construction, extended to general enumerable diagrams, can be used to show
that enumerable T models are weakly reflective in enumerable diagrams, as
in the classical case, is rather expected and straightforward. We therefore
state the following for reference and without proof.
Proposition 2.2.14 Let T be an enumerable regular theory. There exists
a chase-complete set S of enumerable diagrams with a chase functor Ch :
S //M—where M is the subcategory of model diagrams—which is moreover
a weak reflection. That is, for any homomorphism h : (D,F ) // (D′, F ′) in
S where (D′, F ′) ∈M there exists a homomorphism hˆ :Ch(D,F ) // (D′, F ′)
such that
Ch(D,F ) (D′, F ′)
hˆ //
(D,F )
OO
c(D,F )
::
h
tt
tt
tt
tt
tt
commutes.
3 Joyal’s theorem
Let T be a coherent (or regular) theory. A coherent (regular) formula-in-
context [x | φ] induces an evaluation functor
Ev[x | φ] :Mod(T) // Set
byM 7→ [[x|φ]]M. Mapping a formula-in-context to its corresponding evalua-
tion functor defines (by soundness) a functor Ev : CT //Set
Mod(T), which we
also call the evaluation functor, trusting that context will prevent confusion.
Since the coherent structure in a presheaf category is computed pointwise,
the following is immediate and stated only for emphasis and reference.
Lemma 3.0.1 Let T be a coherent (regular) theory and CT its coherent
(regular) syntactic category. The functor
Ev : CT // Set
Mod(T)
which sends a formula to its corresponding evaluation functor is coherent
(regular).
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We can now give the “constructive content” of the Kripke completeness the-
orem of A. Joyal—cf. [18, Thm 6.3.5]—first in the form of the following
theorem for regular theories. Since the purpose is to give a constructive
restatement of this classical theorem, we state it first in terms of arbitrary
signatures and ordinary Tarski models. The proof is not in essence dissim-
ilar from the one in [18]. Recall that by Corollary 2.2.7 there are strongly
complete sets of models for regular theories.
Theorem 3.0.2 Let Σ be a single sorted theory, not restricted in size, nor
necessarily discrete (and possibly containing function symbols). Let T be a
regular theory over Σ, and let M be a full subcategory of Mod(T) such that
M is strongly conservative. Then the functor
Ev : CT // Set
M
is a) conservative and b) whenever the pullback functor f* :SubCT(B)
//SubCT(A)
induced by a morphism f :A // B in CT has a right adjoint ∀f we have for
all S ∈ SubCT(A) that Ev(∀f (S)) = ∀Ev(f)(Ev(S)).
Proof a) For formulas [x | φ] and [x | ψ], if Ev[x | φ](M) ⊆ Ev[x | ψ](M)
for all M ∈ M then M  (φ ⊢x ψ) for all M ∈ M, whence φ ⊢
T
x ψ by
completeness.
b) The non-trivial direction is Ev(∀f (S)) ⊇ ∀Ev(f)(Ev(S)). It suffices to
consider a situation
A = [x | φ] B = [y | ψ]
f=|[x,y | λ]|
//
S = [x | θ]
 _

∀f (S) = [y | γ] _

in CT, where θ ⊢
T
x φ and γ ⊢
T
y ψ. Applying the functor Ev and evaluating at
a model M we have
{d M  φ(d)} {c M  ψ(c)}
Evf (M)={d,c Mλ(d,c)}
//
{d M  θ(d)}
 _

{c M  γ(c)}
 _

Let c ∈ ∀Evf (Ev[x | θ])(M) ⊆ Ev[y | ψ](M). Accordingly, for all g :M
//N
in M we have:
Evf ((N))
−1 (Ev[y | ψ](g)(c)) ⊆ Ev[x | θ](N). (1)
We show M  γ(c). Let g :M // N be a morphism in M, with N′ the
corresponding TM-model. By (1) we have
N′  (λ[c/y] ⊢x θ) (2)
16
Thus, the sequent (2) is true in all TM-models corresponding to homomor-
phisms from M in M, and therefore provable in TM, by the assumption of
strong completeness. By Lemma 2.1.3, there is a regular formula ξ in con-
text y such thatM  ξ(c) and T proves the sequent (ξ∧λ ⊢x,y θ). But then,
since ∀f ([x | θ]) = [y | γ], we have that T proves the sequent (ξ ∧ ψ ⊢y γ).
Whence M  γ(c). ⊣
It is convenient to have a name for the property proved in Theorem 3.0.2.
Following e.g. [5] (at least for the first notion):
Definition 3.0.3 We say that a functor F:C //D from a coherent category
to a Heyting category is conditionally Heyting if it is coherent and preserves
any right adjoints to pullback functors that might exist in C. If F and C are
regular, we say F is conditionally sub-Heyting if it is regular and preserves
any right adjoints to pullback functors that might exist in C.
The equivalence Mod(T) ≃ MDiag(T) induces an equivalence SetMod(T) ≃
SetMDiag(T). Accordingly, ifM is a strongly complete set of model diagrams,
the composite
CT
Ev // Setq(M) ≃ SetM
is conservative and conditionally sub-Heyting. When returning to working
with diagrams in the sequel, we shall consider this functor, also under the
name Ev.
As a corollary Theorem 3.0.2 we have the following version for coherent
theories. Strongly complete sets of models do not in general exist for coher-
ent theories. By Proposition2.2.9, however, they do for enumerable positive
coherent theories under the assumption of the Fan theorem.
Corollary 3.0.4 Let T be a coherent theory, with CT its coherent syntactic
category, and suppose M is a strongly conservative category of T-model
diagrams. Then the evaluation functor
Ev : CT // Set
M
is a conservative and conditionally Heyting functor.
Proof The proof of 3.0.2 can be repeated for this case. Alternatively,
consider the regular Morleyization Tm of the coherent theory T. Notice,
first, thatM can then be considered as a full subcategory of Mod(Tm), and
as such it is then strongly conservative for Tm. Then notice that evaluation
restricted to M yields a coherent functor from CT ≃ CTm to Set
M. ⊣
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4 Sheaf completeness
4.1 Modified completeness
Loosely and informally, let us say that a model is modified if some connec-
tives are interpreted in a non-standard way, and standard otherwise. We say
that it is fallible if the only connective treated non-standardly is ⊥. It is a
corollary of Theorem 2.2.4 and Lemma 2.2.5 that regular⊥ theories are com-
plete with respect to fallible Tarski semantics. Now, if T is, say, a regular⊥
theory, Tm it’s regular Morleyization, and M is a small, full, and strongly
conservative subcategory of MDiag(Tm), we have that the evaluation functor
Ev : CT ≃ CTm // Set
M
is regular (in particular). But it does not preserve the initial object, as
Ev[ | P⊥](−) is not the constant empty functor 0. Thus it can be viewed as
a conservative fallible presheaf model of T. We shall obtain a conservative
standard sheaf model by taking sheaves with respect to the least coverage
(on Mop) so that Ev[ | P⊥](−) is identified with 0. Accordingly, we obtain
a model of T in a closed subtopos (in the sense of [11, A4.5.3]) of SetM.
Similarly, if T is a coherent theory and Tm its regular Morleyization, Ev :
CT // Set
M does not preserve finite disjunctions. A conservative standard
model will be obtained by sheafifying with respect to the least coverage such
that finite disjunctions are preserved. A conservative model will also be given
by a slightly stronger coverage given (in part) in terms of binary trees and
which is, in that sense, akin to a (fallible) Beth model. Classically, or in a
enumerable setting, the latter two coverages are equivalent. In a countable
setting, they also give rise to a Beth-completeness theorem, establishing a
link between the least coverage forcing a standard interpretation and Beth
semantics.
The coverages are given in terms of sieves on Mop, and thus cosieves
on M. Explicitly, then, let T be a theory in a fragment with ⊥, Tm its
regular Morleyization, and M a small full subcategory of MDiag(Tm). Let
the exploding coverage E be the coverage which assigns to each (D,F ) ∈ M
the set of cosieves E(D,F ) = {∅ P⊥ ∈ F}. This is a coverage (in the sense
of [11, A2.1.9, C2.1.1]) since if S ∈ E(D1, F1) and f : (D1, F1) // (D2, F2)
is a homomorphism, then S = ∅ and P⊥ ∈ F1, whence P⊥ ∈ F2, since it is
preserved by f , so ∅ ∈ E(D2, F2). We then have the following addition to
Theorem 3.0.2.
Proposition 4.1.1 Let T be an (at least) regular⊥ theory, T
m its regu-
lar Morleyization, M be a strongly conservative, small, full subcategory of
MDiag(Tm) and E be the exploding coverage. Then the evaluation functor
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factors through sheaves
CT ≃ CTm Set
MEv //
Sh(Mop, E)
%%▲▲
▲▲
▲▲
▲ OO
 ?
So that Ev : CT // Sh(M
op, E) is conservative, conditionally sub-Heyting,
and preserves the initial object.
Proof By Theorem 3.0.2 it remains only to show that Ev factors through
Sh(Mop, E) and that Ev[ | ⊥](−) is terminal in Sh(M
op, E). First, Ev[x | φ](−)
is a sheaf since if S ∈ E(D,F ), then S is empty and (D,F ) is explod-
ing, which means that Ev[x | φ](D,F ) = {∗}. Second, Ev[ | ⊥](D,F ) =
{∗ P⊥ ∈ F} which is the initial sheaf in Sh(M
op, E). ⊣
Note that classically the standard (i.e. non-exploding) models in M are
dense (in the sense of [11]), so that then Sh(Mop, E) ≃ SetM
s
whereMs is
the full subcategory of standard models.
Next, let T be a theory in a fragment with ∨ and ⊥, with Tm its regular
Morleyization and M a small full subcategory of MDiag(Tm). Again,
Ev : CT ≃ CTm // Set
M
is regular and conservative, but fails to preserve ∨ as well as ⊥. Again we
make explicit the least coverage B forcing a standard interpretation. That is,
the least coverage such that the initial object 0 is dense in Ev[ | P⊥](−) and,
for all disjunctions [x | φ ∨ ψ] of T, Ev[x | Pφ](−) ∨ Ev[x | Pψ ](−) is dense in
Ev[x | Pφ∨ψ](−). First, for all disjunctions(-in-context) [x | φ ∨ ψ] of T, model
diagrams (D,F ) in M, and lists of elements d ∈ Dl(x), let S〈[x | Pφ∨ψ],d〉 be
the following cosieve on (D,F ):
S〈[x | Pφ∨ψ],d〉 =
{
h:(D,F ) // (D′, F ′) (D′, F ′)  Pφ[h(d)/x] ∨ Pψ[h(d)/x]
}
Then let B be specified by
B(D,F ) = E(D,F ) ∪
{
S〈[x | Pφ∨ψ]〉,d 〈[x | Pφ∨ψ],d〉 ∈ F
}
Again, B is a coverage. We refer to it as the minimal coverage. A connection
to Beth semantics will be displayed in Section 4.1.14. The proof of the
following is similar to that of Theorem 4.1.4, and a corollary of it if M is
chase-complete, and is therefore omitted.
Proposition 4.1.2 Let T be an (at least) coherent theory, Tm its regu-
lar Morleyization, M a strongly conservative, small, full subcategory of
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MDiag(Tm), and B be the minimal coverage on Mop. Then the evaluation
functor Ev composed with the sheafification functor a:SetM // Sh(Mop, B)
CT Set
MEv //
Sh(Mop, B)
a◦Ev %%▲▲
▲▲
▲▲
▲▲ OO
 ?
//
%%
a

is conservative, coherent, and conditionally Heyting.
If M is chase-complete, then the minimal coverage on Mop can be
strengthened while still yielding a conservative T-model as follows. Let
(D,F ) ∈ M, let [x | φ ∨ ψ] be a disjunction of T, and let d ∈ D such that
〈[x | Pφ∨ψ],d〉 ∈ F . Then we have,
Ch(D,F ∪ {Pφ[d]})
(D,F )
ee
c0 ▲
▲▲
▲▲
▲
Ch(D,F ∪ {Pψ[d]})99
c1rr
rr
rr
with c0 the homomorphism induced by (D,F ) ⊆ (D,F∪{Pφ[d]}) ⊆ Ch(D,F∪
{Pφ[d]}), and similarly for c1. We refer to such a pair, given by a fact of the
form 〈[x | Pφ∨ψ ],d〉 in F , as a chase pair over (D,F ). Since Ch is a functor,
assigning to each (D,F ) ∈ M the set of chase pairs over it is a coverage. To
this we also add the coverage E, so that the family of covering families over
(D,F ) is the union of the set of chase pairs and the set {∅ (D,F )  P⊥}.
Denote the resulting coverage by C, and the least Grothendieck coverage
containing C by C. Similarly, write B for the least Grothendieck coverage
containing B. We refer to C as the disjunctive coverage. The two coverages
compare as follows.
Lemma 4.1.3 Let T be a coherent theory, Tm its regular Morleyization,
and M a chase-complete category of model diagrams for Tm. Let B and C
be the least Grothendieck coverages containing the minimal and disjunctive
coverages on Mop, respectively. Then B ⊆ C. Moreover,
1. If Ch is a weak reflection then also C ⊆ B.
2. The statement that C = B for arbitrary T is equivalent to the Axiom
of Choice.
Proof (1) and that C ⊇ B is clear. Since (2) can be considered more of a
remark that will play no further role for us here, we only outline the proof:
Consider the coherent theory T with unary predicate symbols B and B¯,
one binary relation symbol R, and the axioms
B(x) ∧ B¯(x) ⊢x ⊥ B(x) ⊢x ∃y.R(x, y) ⊣
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A surjection e : Y // X can be considered as a T-model, and therefore a
T
m-model E by, briefly, letting |E| be X +Y , X be the extension of B, and
the extension of R be the inverse of the graph of e.
Write βx :=
∧
x∈x(B(x) ∨ B¯(x)). Let (D,F ) be the Σ
m-diagram pre-
sented by D = {∗} and
F =
{
〈[x | Pφ],~∗〉 [x | φ] coherent in canonical context, and β
x ⊢Tx φ
}
.
Then (D,F ) is a (finite) Tm-model diagram.
Now, if C = B then the family S〈[x | PB(x)∨B¯(x)],∗〉 is the sieve generated by
the chase pair given by 〈[x | PB(x)∨B¯(x)], ∗〉. Then, for a surjection e : Y //X
, elements inX induces homomorphisms (D,F ) //E, and the lifting through
Ch(D,F ∪ {PB(x)[ ∗ ]}) gives a splitting of e (see the proof of Theorem 5.16
in [9]).
Theorem 4.1.4 Let T be an at least coherent theory, Tm its regular Mor-
leyization, M a full, chase-complete subcategory of MDiag(Tm), and C be
the disjunctive coverage on Mop. Then the evaluation functor Ev composed
with the sheafification functor a:SetM // Sh(Mop, C)
CT Set
MEv //
Sh(Mop, C)
a◦Ev %%▲▲
▲▲
▲▲
▲▲ OO
 ?
//
%%
a

is conservative, coherent, and conditionally Heyting.
Proof Let Un = Ev[x | ⊤](−) where the length of x is n. Recall from e.g.
[15] that the (coherent) sheafification functor a restricts to (one half of)
a poset isomorphism between closed subobjects of Un and subobjects of
a(Un),
ClSub(Un) ∼= Sub(a(Un))
It follows that it is sufficient to show that, for any formula [x | θ] of T, the
functor Ev[x | Pθ](−) is C-closed in the subobject lattice of U
n. Let (D,F ) ∈
M, let [y | φ ∨ ψ] be a disjunction of T, and let d ∈ Dlength(y) such that
(D,F )  Pφ∨ψ[d/y]. Let (D1, F1) = Ch(D,F ∪ {Pφ[d]})) and (D2, F2) =
Ch(D,F ∪ {Pψ [d]})). Let c ∈ D
n and assume (D1, F1), (D2, F2)  Pθ[c/x].
Then Tm(D,F ) proves the sequents Pφ[d/y] ⊢ Pθ[c/x] and Pψ[d/y] ⊢ Pθ[c/x].
Thus there exists proofs with premisses in Tm of χ∧Pφ[d/y] ⊢ Pθ[c/x] and
ξ ∧ Pψ[d/y] ⊢ Pθ[c/x] where χ and ξ are conjunctions of atomic sentences
over Σ∪D which are true in (D,F ). By Lemma 2.1.2, there are proofs with
the same premisses of sequents χ′ ∧ P ′φ ⊢w P
′
θ and ξ
′ ∧ P ′′ψ ⊢v P
′′
θ over Σ,
where we assume w and v disjoint, and a function f :w,v // D such that
χ′[f ] = χ and ξ′[f ] = ξ and P ′φ[f ] = Pφ[d/y] and P
′′
ψ [f ] = Pψ[d/y] and
P ′θ[f ] = P
′′
θ [f ] = Pθ[c/x]. Form the finite set E of equalities with variables
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from the (assumed disjoint) lists w,v, x, and y as follows: for each argument
slot in Pφ, with that slot occupied by, say, y in Pφ, w in P
′
φ, and v in P
′′
φ ,
add y = w and y = v to E; for each argument slot in Pψ, with that slot
occupied by, say, y in Pψ, w in P
′
ψ, and v in P
′′
ψ , add y = w and y = v to E;
and for each argument slot in Pθ, with that slot occupied by, say, x in Pθ,
w in P ′θ, and v in P
′′
θ , add x = w and x = v to E. Let ρ be the conjunction
of the equalities in E. Extend f by: if x occurs in an equality in ρ, say
x = w, then add x 7→ f(w); and if y occurs in an equality in ρ, say y = w,
then add y 7→ f(w). Notice that this is well defined and Pφ[f ] = Pφ[d/y],
Pψ[f ] = Pψ[d/y], and Pθ[f ] = Pθ[c/x]. Then: 1) ρ[f ] is true in (D,F ) and
2) the sequents ∃w,v. ρ∧χ′∧ξ′∧Pφ ⊢x,y Pθ and ∃w,v. ρ∧χ
′∧ξ′∧Pψ ⊢x,y Pθ
are provable in Tm. We can replace the regular formula ∃w,v. ρ∧χ′ ∧ ξ′ by
an atomic formula in Σm; say Pγ . We then have that T proves the sequents
γ ∧ φ ⊢x,y θ and γ ∧ ψ ⊢x,y θ. Thus T proves γ ∧ (φ ∨ ψ) ⊢x,y θ, whence
T
m proves Pγ ∧ Pφ∨ψ ⊢x,y Pθ. Since substituting d for y and c for x makes
the antecedent true in the Tm-model (D,F ), Pθ[c/x] must also be true in
(D,F ). ⊣
4.1.5 Kripke and generalized Beth models
The models of 4.1.1 and 4.1.4 can be translated to models in presheaves
and sheaves on posets using e.g. the Diaconescu cover (see e.g. [15] for a
description of the Diaconescu cover). However, in our current setting, we
can use, more directly, the poset of model diagrams and inclusions. We state
this also as covering lemma, the technical heart of which is the following.
Write MDiag⊆(T) for the poset of of model diagrams and inclusions. Write
π :MDiag⊆(T) // MDiag(T) for the functor that sends an inclusion to the
homomorphism it induces.
Lemma 4.1.6 Let MDiag(T) be the category of model diagrams for some
(regular or coherent) theory T. For any homomorphism h:(D0, F0) //(D1, F1)
where D0 and D1 are disjoint there exists an extension a : (D0, F0) ⊆ (D2, F2)
and homomorphisms r and i as in the following diagram
(D0, F0) (D2, F2)
π(a)
//
(D1, F1)::
h
tt
tt
tt
tt
tt
tt
tt
i

//
:: KK
r
such that the outer triangle commutes and r ◦ i is the identity on (D1, F1).
Proof Let D2 = D0 ∪ D1 and let F2 be the diagram generated by F0 ∪
F1 ∪ {d = d′ h(d, d′)}. We have a : (D0, F0) ⊆ (D2, F2). Let i be the
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homomorphism induced by the inclusion (D1, F1) ⊆ (D2, F2). Then
π(a)(d, d′)⇔ ∃c ∈ D1. h(d, c) ∧ i(c, d
′)
so the outer triangle commutes. Let r(d′, d) ⇔ (d′ = d) ∈ F1 ∨ h(d
′, d). It
is then straightforward that r is a well-defined homomorphism, as well as
both a left and right inverse to i, from which it also follows that (D2, F2) is
a T-model diagram. ⊣
Clearly, the assumption that the domain and codomain of h are disjoint can
be done without loss if the codomain can be replaced by an isomorphic copy
disjoint from both it and the domain. IfM is a chase-complete set of model
diagrams for a regular theory T and M⊆ is the poset of model diagrams in
M and inclusions, then Lemma 4.1.6 implies (by e.g. [11, C3.1.2]) that the
restriction functor
SetM
π∗ // SetM
⊆
is Heyting and conservative. By Theorem 3.0.2 we then obtain the following
new version of Joyal’s theorem:
Theorem 4.1.7 Let T be a regular theory and M⊆ a chase-complete set of
model diagrams ordered by inclusions. Then the evaluation functor
CT // Set
M⊆
is conservative and conditionally sub-Heyting.
We have, as corollaries to Theorem 3.0.2 (or Proposition 4.1.1), (fallible)
Kripke completeness results for theories in certain fragments of first-order
logic. By 4.1.6, the underlying poset of the Kripke models can be taken to
be a set of model diagrams for the regular Morleyization of T ordered by
inclusion. Similarly, as a corollary of Theorem 4.1.4 we have a completeness
theorem for first-order theories with respect to a generalized version of Beth
semantics. These are fairly straighforward cases of translating models on
presheaves and sheaves on posets to Kripke and Beth-style presentations.
For explicitness, we give some further details, also making clear what notions
of Kripke and “generalized” Beth models we have in mind:
Let Σ be a relational signature. Write S for the partially ordered class
of Σ-diagrams and (homomorphic) inclusions. Thus an object S in S is
a Tarski structure for Σ with a congruence relation [[=]]S interpreting =.
Write F for the partially ordered class of fallible Σ-diagrams and diagram
inclusions: an object S in F is an inhabited diagram for Σ with a subset
[[⊥]]S ⊆ 1 of the terminal set interpreting ⊥, and such that S satisfies the
axioms ⊥ ⊢x φ for all atomic formulas φ in canonical context x over Σ. The
inclusions in F must preserve [[⊥]], i.e. S ⊆ S′ ⇒ [[⊥]]S ⊆ [[⊥]]S
′
.
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Definition 4.1.8 (I) Let Σ be a relational signature. By a generalized
(fallible) Beth structure for Σ we mean a triple 〈P,D, T 〉 where P is a poset;
D is a functor from P to S (F ); and T is an assignment of inhabited sets
of subposets of P to nodes of P such that:
(i) all elements of T (p) are finite, binary trees with root p, and T (p) is
closed under initial binary subtrees;
(ii) if t ∈ T (p) with leaf nodes q1, . . . , qn and t1 ∈ T (q1), . . . , qn ∈ T (qn)
then the tree obtained by extending t with the ti’s is in T (p); and for
all p ∈ P , t ∈ T (p), and q ∈ t, t∩ ↑ q ∈ T (q); and
(iii) for all p ≤ p′ in P and t ∈ T (p) there exists t′ ∈ T (p′) such that for all
leaf nodes q′ of t′ there exists a leaf node q of t such that q ≤ q′.
The clauses of the forcing relation p  φ[d/x] between p ∈ P , first-order
formulas-in-context x.φ, and d ∈ D(p)l(x) are then:
(a) for φ atomic or equal ⊥ or ⊤, p  φ[d/x] if there exists t ∈ T (p) such
that for all leaf nodes q ∈ t it is the case that D(q)  φ[d/x];
(b) for φ = ψ ∧ θ, p  φ[d/x] if p  ψ[d/x] and p  θ[d/x];
(c) for φ = ψ ∨ θ, p  φ[d/x] if there exists t ∈ T (p) such that for all leaf
nodes q in t it is the case that q  ψ[d/x] or q  θ[d/x];
(d) for φ = ψ → θ, p  φ[d/x] if for all p′ ≥ p it is the case that if
p′  ψ[d/x] then p′  θ[d/x];
(e) for φ = ∃y. ψ, p  φ[d/x] if there exists t ∈ T (p) such that for all leaf
nodes q in t there exists c ∈ D(q) such that q  ψ[c/y,d/x]; and
(f) for φ = ∀y. ψ, p  φ[d/x] if for all p′ ≥ p and all c ∈ D(p′) it is the case
that q  ψ[c/y,d/x].
(II) By a (fallible) Kripke structure we mean a generalized (fallible)
Beth structure where T (p) contains only the one node tree on p.
(III) By (fallible) Beth structure we mean a generalized (fallible) Beth
structure where P is a binary tree and T (p) is the set of initial binary
subtrees of ↑ (p). (This notion of Beth structure is, then, with respect to
the strong rather than the weak notion of forcing, cf. [26, Ch.13 1.8].)
(IV) By a (generalized, fallible) Beth⋆ structure we mean a (generalized,
fallible) Beth structure where “covers are only relevant for disjunctions”, i.e.
one satisfying the following additional conditions:
(1) for φ atomic or ⊥, it is the case that p  φ[d] iff p  φ[d], and
(2) for all formulas of the form ∃x. φ ∈ L, it is the case that p  ∃x. φ[d] iff
there exists a ∈ p such that p  φ[a,d].
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We state corollaries of Theorem 4.1.7, Proposition 4.1.1, and Theorem
4.1.4 in terms of Definition 4.1.8. Let the ∨-free fragment of FOL be the
fragment consisting of sequents not mentioning the connective ∨, and the
⊥,∨-free fragment be the one not mentioning ⊥ or ∨.
Corollary 4.1.9 Let T be a theory in the ⊥,∨-free fragment over the signa-
ture Σ. Then there exists a Kripke model for T which is conservative (with
respect to the ⊥,∨-free fragment).
Proof Let Tm over Σm be the regular Morleyization of T. By Theorem
2.2.4 there exists a chase-complete category M of model diagrams for Tm.
By Theorem 4.1.7, the evaluation functor Ev : CT ≃ CTm // Set
M⊆ is
conditonally sub-Heyting, thus giving a conservative (w.r.t. the ⊥,∨-free
fragment) model of T. Define a Kripke structure K by letting the poset P
be M⊆ and the functor D :M⊆ //S be the forgetfull functor. Let x.φ be
⊥,∨-free over Σ, S ∈ M⊆, and d a list of the same length as x of elements
in the domain of S . Using that S  Pφ[d/x]⇔ [d] ∈ Evx.φ(S) and that Ev
is conditionally sub-Heyting, a straightforward induction argument on x.φ
shows that S K φ[d/x]⇔ S  Pφ[d/x].
Corollary 4.1.10 Let T be a ∨-free theory. Then there exists a fallible
Kripke model for T which is conservative with respect to the ∨-free fragment.
Proof From Proposition 4.1.1 and Theorem 4.1.7 (similarly to 4.1.9).
Remark 4.1.11 The restrictions are essential. The existence of a conser-
vative Kripke model (that is, a non-fallible one) for ∨-free theories implies
LEM (see [19])6. A Kripke completeness theorem for ⊥-free theories, or a
fallible Kripke completeness theorem for full FOL, would imply e.g. that the
Boolean Prime Ideal theorem is provable in ZF. For theories whose axioms
do not mention ⊥ or ∨, such as the empty theory, the existence of a Kripke
model which is conservative with respect to all first-order sequents implies
MP (see [19]).
As an example application of Theorem 4.1.7, we give a short, semantic
proof of the disjunction property for (arbitrary) ∨-free theories (cf. [24]) by
reducing it to the disjunction property for regular theories (see e.g. [11]; note
that the disjunction property for regular theories also directly follows from
Proposition 2.2.3).
Corollary 4.1.12 Let T be a first-order theory the axioms of which are
∨-free, and let φ, ψ, and θ be ∨-free formulas. If T proves the sequent
φ ⊢x ψ ∨ θ, then T proves either φ ⊢x ψ or φ ⊢x θ.
6In fact, it is equivalent to it, since with LEM we can distinguish between exploding
and non-exploding models.
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Proof Consider the fallible Kripke model of Corollary 4.1.10. (As in 4.1.9)
the nodes are models of Tm and for all ∨-free formulas ξ we have (D,F ) 
Pξ[d/x] ⇔ (D,F )  ξ[d/x]. Then for any (D,F ) in M
⊆ and d ∈ Dl(x)
we have: (D,F )  Pφ[d/x] ⇔ (D,F )  φ[d/x] ⇒ (D,F )  (ψ ∨ θ)[d/x]
⇒ (D,F )  ψ[d/x] or (D,F )  θ[d/x] ⇔ (D,F )  Pψ[d/x] or (D,F ) 
Pθ[d/x] ⇔ (D,F )  (Pψ ∨ Pθ)[d/x]. Thus by Lemma 2.2.6, T
m proves the
sequent Pφ ⊢x Pψ ∨ Pθ. Therefore, T
m proves the sequent Pφ ⊢x Pψ or the
sequent Pφ ⊢x Pθ, whence T proves φ ⊢x ψ or φ ⊢x θ.
Finally, for full first-order logic we have:
Corollary 4.1.13 Let T be a first-order theory. Then T has a conservative
generalized fallible Beth⋆ model.
Proof Let Tm be the regular Morleyization of T over extended signature
Σm, with Σ the signature of T. By Theorem 2.2.4 there exists a chase-
complete category M of model diagrams for Tm. By Theorem 4.1.4 the
functor a ◦ Ev : CT ≃ CTm // Sh(M
op, C) is conservative and Heyting.
From Lemma 4.1.6, by [11, C2.3.18–19(i)] and [11, C3.1.23], the (right) top
functor of the following commutative (up to isomorphism) diagram
SetM SetM
⊆
π∗
//
Sh(Mop, C)
OO
a
Sh
(
M⊆
op
, C
)a◦π∗◦i //
OO
a
CT ≃ CTm Ev
//
77
a◦Ev
♦♦
♦♦
♦♦
♦♦
♦♦
♦♦
♦♦
♦♦
♦♦
OO
⊣
is Heyting and conservative. Hence so is the composite top functor. As in
the proof of 4.1.4, the subpresheaves of the form π∗ ◦Ev[x | φ]
  //π∗ ◦Ev[x | ⊤]
are C-closed.
Define a generalized fallible Beth structure B as follows. Let P beM⊆,
and let the functor D :M⊆ // F send a Σm-diagram S to its Σ reduct
extended with [[⊥]]S := [[P⊥]]
S . For S ∈ M⊆ let T (S) be the set of finite
binary trees with nodes in M⊆, root S, and such that the children of any
node S′ form a chase pair (as given in the paragraph following 4.1.2) over
S′.
Let x.φ be first-order over Σ, S ∈ M⊆, and d a list of the same length
as x of elements in the domain of S . We show by induction on φ that
S B φ[d/x] ⇔ S  Pφ[d/x]. And, simultaneously, that B satisfies the
conditions for being a Beth⋆ structure.
Let φ be atomic or φ = ⊥. Suppose S B φ[d/x]. Then there exists
a tree t ∈ T (S) such that for all leaves S′ it is the case that D(S′)  φ[d].
Hence S′  Pφ[d/x]. Now, the inclusions S ⊆ S
′ define a C-cover, so
S  Pφ[d/x], and thus D(S)  φ[d/x]. The converse is immediate. The
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case for the existential quantifier is similar, and the the case for conjuction
is immediate.
Let φ = ψ ∨ θ. Suppose S B φ[d/x]. Then there exists a tree t ∈ T (S)
such that for all leaves S′ it is the case that S′ B ψ[d] or S′ B ψ[d].
By induction hypothesis S′  Pψ[d] or S
′
 Pθ[d], so S
′
 Pφ[d], and since
t defines a C-cover on S, S  Pφ[d]. Conversely, suppose S  Pφ[d/x].
Then 〈[x | φ],d〉 defines a chase pair on S, yielding a tree in T (S) with two
leaves S′ and S′′ such that, by the induction hypothesis, S′ B ψ[d] and
S′′ B φ[d].
Let φ = ∀y. ψ. Suppose S B φ[d/x]. Then for all S ⊆ S′ we have
D(S′) B ψ[d/x, c/y] for all c in the domain of S′, thus by induction hy-
pothesis S′  Pψ[d, c]. Hence, since π
∗ ◦ Ev:CT ≃ CTm //Set
M⊆ is Heyting,
S  Pφ[d/x]. The converse follows from P∀y.ψ ⊢
Tm
x,y Pψ. And → is similar.
4.1.14 Beth completeness
For enumerable first-order T we specialize 4.1.4/4.1.13 to the effect that for
every Tm-model diagram (D,F ) in suitableM there is a Beth model B with
root domain D such that B  φ[d/x]⇔ (D,F )  Pφ[d/x] for all first-order
φ. This yields a Beth⋆ completeness theorem for T.
Specifically, let T be a enumerable first-order theory over a signature
Σ and Tm its regular Morleyization. In this section, we assume that the
sequent ⊤ ⊢ ∃x. x = x is an axiom of T. We refer to theories having this
sequent as an axiom as habitative LetM be the subcategory of MDiagb(T
m)
consisting of diagrams (D,F ) of the following form. The domain D is a
semi-decidable subset of N, coding a bounded relation from N to N. D
comes equipped with the least upper bound. Denote by fD the function
fD : N // 2
N such that D = {n ∈ N ∃m ∈ N. f(n)(m) = 1}. The set of
facts F is, similarly, (coded as) a semi-decidable subset of N (with function
fF ). Then, straightforwardly, M is chase-complete (for T
m) with a weakly
reflective chase functor. We can assume that if (D,F ) is a diagram and
(D′, F ′) = Ch(D,F ) then fD ≤ fD′ and fF ≤ fF ′ . We fix an enumeration g
of (codes of) all possible facts of the form 〈[x | Pφ∨ψ],d〉, where every such
fact is revisited an infinite number of times.
For any (D,F ) ∈ M we define a binary tree TD,F over (D,F ), where
TD,F occurs as a subcategory of M, as follows. The diagram (D,F ) is
the root. At node (D′, F ′) at level n, if g(n) is, say, 〈[x | Pφ∨ψ],d〉 and
∃m ≤ n. fF ′(g(n),m) = 1 then (D
′, F ′) has the children Ch(D′, F ′∪{Pφ[d]})
and Ch(D′, F ′ ∪ {Pψ [d]}). Else the children of (D
′, F ′) are both (D′, F ′)
itself. In the former case, we say that 〈[x | Pφ∨ψ],d〉 is chased.
TD,F becomes a fallible Beth structure for Σ by setting P = TD,F , and
letting the functor D : TD,F // F send a Σ
m-diagram S to its Σ reduct
extended with [[⊥]]S := [[P⊥]]
S . It is clear that for any node q of TD,F , any
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level of TD,F above it can be seen as a C-cover of q (and therefore also a
B-cover, since B = C in this setting). We refer to it therefore also as “a
cover of q”. By the proof of Theorem 4.1.4, we have, therefore, that for any
atomic formula x.Pφ of Σ
m, any node q in TD,F , and any elements d of q, if
Pφ[d/x] is true on a cover of q then q  Pφ[d/x].
Lemma 4.1.15 Let (D,F ) ∈M and consider the Beth-structure TD,F . Let
p be a node in TD,F , let x.φ be a first-order formula over Σ, with Pφ the
corresponding atomic formula in Σm, and let d ∈ p. Then
p  φ[d/x]⇔ p  Pφ[d/x]
Proof By induction on φ, as follows.
φ atomic or φ = ⊥: by the remark immediately preceding this lemma.
φ ≡ ϕ ∧ ψ or φ = ⊤: immediate.
φ = ϕ∨ψ: Assume p  (ϕ∨ψ)[d]. Then there exists a cover of p such that
for all q in the cover either q  ϕ[d] or q  ψ[d]. By induction hypothesis,
then, either q  Pϕ[d] or q  Pψ[d]. As T
m proves e.g. Pϕ ⊢x Pϕ∨ψ therefore
q  Pϕ∨ψ[d]. Whence p  Pϕ∨ψ[d].
Conversely, assume that p  Pϕ∨ψ[d]. Then for all q ≥ p, we have q 
Pϕ∨ψ[d]. Therefore, there exists a cover of p, say at level n, such that on
that cover Pϕ∨ψ[d] is chased. Then for all q ≥ p at level n + 1 we have
that either q  Pϕ[d] or q  Pψ[d]. Whence, by induction hypothesis, either
q  ϕ[d] or q  ψ[d], and so p  (ϕ ∨ ψ)[d].
φ = ∃y. ϕ: We have that p  ∃y. ϕ[d] iff q  ϕ[aq,d] on a cover iff
q  Pϕ[aq,d] on a cover iff q  ∃y. Pϕ[d] on a cover iff q  P∃x.ϕ[d] on a cover
iff p  P∃y.ϕ[d] .
φ = ϕ → ψ: Assume that p  Pϕ→ψ[d]. Let q ≥ p and assume that
q  ϕ[d]. By induction hypothesis q  Pϕ[d]. Now, T
m proves the sequent
Pϕ ∧ Pϕ→ψ ⊢x Pψ. Whence q  Pψ [d]. And so applying the induction
hypothesis again, q  ψ[d]. Hence p  (ϕ→ ψ)[d].
For the converse direction, observe first that for (D,F ) ∈ M we have that
(D,F )  Pϕ→ψ[d] iff Ch(D,F ∪ {Pϕ[d]})  Pψ[d]: for the right-to-left di-
rection, the right hand side implies that there is a Tm-provable sequent
Pχ ∧ Pφ ⊢x Pψ such that (D,F )  Pχ[d/x]. Whence T proves χ ∧ φ ⊢x ψ
and therefore χ ⊢x φ → ψ, so that T
m proves Pχ ⊢x Pφ→ψ. Now, assume
that p  (ϕ → ψ)[d]. We have p  P⊤∨ϕ[d], so there exists a level n where
it is chased. For a node q = (D′, F ′) on level n, the right child is therefore
q′ = Ch(D,F ∪ {Pϕ(d)}). By induction hypothesis, q
′
 Pϕ[d] implies that
q′  ϕ[d]. Thus since q′ ≥ p we have by assumption that q′  ψ[d], so
q′  Pψ[d]. So, by the observation, q  Pϕ→ψ[d]. With Pϕ→ψ[d] true on a
cover of p we have, then, that p  Pϕ→ψ[d].
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φ = ∀y. ϕ: Assume that p  P∀y.ϕ[d]. Then for all q ≥ p and a ∈ q we
have that q  Pϕ[a,d], by applying the axiom P∀y.ϕ ⊢y,x Pϕ of T
m. So, by
induction hypothesis, q  ϕ[a,d]. Thus p  ∀x. ϕ[d].
For the converse direction, observe first, similar to the case of the conditional
above, that that for (D,F ) ∈ M we have that (D,F )  P∀x.ϕ[d] iff Ch(D+
1, F )  Pϕ[e,d], for all elements e of Ch(D + 1, F ) (specifically the new
element of D+1). Since T is habitative, this implies that (D,F )  P∀x.ϕ[d]
iff Ch(D,F )  Pϕ[e,d], for all elements e of Ch(D,F ) (specifically any fresh
element e added by an application of the axiom ⊤ ⊢ ∃x. x = x). Assume,
then, that p  ∀x. ϕ[d]. We have p  P⊤∨⊤, so there exist a level n on
which P⊤∨⊤ is chased. For (D
′, F ′) = q ≥ p on level n, either child is
Ch(D′, F ′) and Ch(D′, F ′)  ϕ[e,d], for all elements e in (D′, F ′). By
induction hypothesis, Ch(D′, F ′)  Pϕ[e,d], so q = (D
′, F ′)  P∀x.ϕ[d].
With P∀x.ϕ[d] thus true on a cover, we conclude p  P∀x.ϕ[d]. ⊣
It is clear that given a Beth⋆ model of a first order T, the nodes, and the
root in particular, model Tm. We can now state the converse
Theorem 4.1.16 Let T be a habitative enumerable first-order theory. Let
T
m be its regular Morleyization. For every enumerable Tarski model M of
T
m there exists a fallible Beth⋆ model B of T such that the domain of the root
r is the domain of M, and such that for all m ∈Ml(m) and x.φ first-order,
r  φ[m/x]⇔M  Pφ[m/x]
The following can then be seen as a constructive version of the completeness
theorem of [10].
Corollary 4.1.17 Let T be a habitative enumerable first-order theory. Then
T is complete with respect to fallible Beth⋆ models.
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